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Fighting Novel Diseases
amidst Humanitarian Crises
by Lawrence O. Gostin, Neil R. Sircar, and Eric A. Friedman

T

he Democratic Republic of the
Congo is facing two crises: a
potentially explosive Ebola epidemic and a major insurgency. But they
are not wholly distinct from each other:
the first is intertwined with the second,
and public mistrust and political violence add a dangerous dimension to the
Ebola epidemic. The World Health Organization and other health emergency
responders will increasingly find themselves fighting outbreaks in insecure,
misgoverned or ungoverned zones, possibly experiencing active conflict. Yet
the WHO has neither the mission nor
the capabilities to navigate these security threats. We cannot expect that the
usual public health strategy will succeed
when health workers’ lives are directly
imperiled and community resistance
runs deep. Tackling health emergencies
amidst complex humanitarian crises requires fresh thinking.

Ebola in the DRC

T

he Democratic Republic of the
Congo is bitterly accustomed to
novel diseases and political violence.
The North Kivu Ebola epidemic is
the DRC’s tenth Ebola outbreak and
now the second largest globally, after
that in the West African countries of
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in
2014.1 Making matters worse, combatants vie for dominance in the region, displacing millions of residents
fleeing violence and disease—which

could accelerate and spread within and
beyond the DRC.2 Guerrilla and rebel
groups, notably the Allied Democratic
Forces, fight with government forces
and international peacekeepers. Yet the
long-running United Nations Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) in DRC
has been ineffectual, with UN troops
themselves targeted as hostile forces.3
More than two decades of conflict has
destroyed any sense of order and structure. Systematic rape, murder, and
kidnapping have eroded security and
instilled fear.4 Within this quagmire,
Ebola has now spread to Butembo (a
city of about one million people), while
Uganda has vaccinated health workers
in preparation for cross-border cases.
The WHO has adopted a “ring”
strategy, vaccinating health workers
and individuals at heightened risk of
exposure. The investigational vaccine
is highly effective, yet many infected
and exposed people are lost to followup, often hidden by distrustful family
members. In an atmosphere of violence
and mistrust, vaccination and contact
tracing are seriously disrupted. Each
concussive rebel attack has coincided
with a major spike in cases.
The U.S. State Department has
banned all U.S. personnel from the hot
zone, including from the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).5 In the run-up
to the DRC elections, the State Department also announced an “ordered

departure” of U.S. personnel even from
Kinshasa, where the CDC was working
with the DRC Ministry of Health to
track cases in North Kivu.6 The Kinshasa Ebola operations center may be
left with as little as one CDC expert.
Other countries, such as France and
the United Kingdom, have followed
the U.S. lead and have also withdrawn
from North Kivu. The Trump administration apparently has adopted a policy
of zero risk tolerance, fearing a “Benghazi-style” attack. In a vicious cycle, the
few brave health workers remaining are
under threat, and their inability to contain the epidemic has sadly become yet
another cause of community frustration and anger.
A recent expert consensus statement
urged the Trump administration to deploy all key assets while managing the
security risk with “smart” peacekeeping, diplomacy, and community engagement.7 The CDC personnel ban
will certainly result in more disease and
death in local populations. Deploying
needed assistance is not just the right
thing to do; it is also in our national
interests. Fighting outbreaks at their
source can halt an epidemic before it
spreads regionally, even globally. Global
health leadership enhances American
“soft power.”
In mid-October 2018, acting under
the International Health Regulations,
the WHO director-general Tedros
Ghebreyesus convened an emergency
committee, which recognized the potential for cross-border transmission
but did not recommend declaring the
North Kivu outbreak a public health
emergency of international concern.
This was a mistake. A PHEIC declaration would have underscored the urgency and raised the political profile of
the health crisis amidst the protracted
violence and humanitarian crisis.8
Still, for the first time ever, the
WHO director-general requested UN
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Security Council action on behalf of
global health security.9 On October 30,
the Security Council condemned political attacks, demanding “full, safe, immediate and unhindered access for the
humanitarian personnel.”10 Incredibly,
though, it called on warring parties to
“respect” international humanitarian
law—a plea sure to fall on empty ears in
a conflict where violations are the norm,
while doing little to enhance peacekeeping operations or mobilize funding. The
Security Council urged the DRC to
take responsibility for security, despite
the Congolese military’s own record of
repression and weak capacities.
Commissions established in the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in
West Africa urged decisive UN action
when a health emergency rises beyond
the WHO’s mandate and capacity.11
Now is that time, both because of the
urgency of the DRC epidemic and to set
a precedent, leading the way for future
complex health emergencies. Fighting
disease in conflict zones and disaster
settings is rapidly becoming the new
normal. We need to plan accordingly.
Consider just a few recent examples
in which epidemics have coincided
with political violence. In December
2018, the WHO was forced to extend a
PHEIC for wild polio, which is stubbornly persisting in war-torn Afghanistan and Pakistan. Taliban fighters have
killed dozens of polio vaccine workers,
threatening countless others.12
In Yemen, cholera has killed several
thousand people, as the country’s health
system unravels due to civil strife and
foreign aggression. Beyond disease, the
people of Yemen are dying from starvation.13 Haiti, another country with weak
governance, has unsuccessfully fought a
cholera epidemic ever since UN personnel inadvertently introduced the disease
following a devastating earthquake in
2010.
In unstable countries and regions,
health workers are at major risk. In
2018, Boko Haram killed and abducted
International Committee of the Red
Cross personnel in Nigeria. The ICRC’s
plea for mercy did not save the health
workers’ lives.14 In Syria, rebels and government forces have killed hundreds of
January-February 2019

health workers, including through intentional targeting.15 All this violence
has occurred despite Security Council resolutions condemning attacks on
health workers and facilities.16 International humanitarian law proscribes
attacks on health workers, but it does
not apply to humanitarian workers. The
UN, mindful of this gap in legal protection, has nonetheless refused to extend
the Geneva Conventions to include humanitarian personnel.17
A Blueprint for Fighting Disease
in Conflict Zones

G

iven these trends, it makes little
sense to use the same public health
playbook that has worked in the past.
Health workers must be able to operate freely and safely to bring infectious
diseases under control. Political violence undermines public health’s ability to reach contagious, exposed, or
at-risk individuals to conduct vaccination campaigns and contact investigations or to separate the sick from the
healthy through isolation or quarantine.
Health workers and patients must have
secure access to clinics and hospitals for
diagnosis and medical treatment. At the
same time, first responders must gain
the public’s trust. If local communities
fail to cooperate, if they hide sick family members, if they follow unsafe burial
rituals, or if they go underground or flee
the conflict, an outbreak can rapidly
spin out of control. Further, misinformation can endanger health workers.
In 2015, Guinean villagers slaughtered
health workers under the belief that
they were spreading Ebola.18
Here, we offer a blueprint for fighting diseases in complex humanitarian
emergencies. The building blocks of
security and trust include high-level
political support, street-level diplomacy, community engagement, enhanced
funding, and protection of health professionals working in conflict or disaster
zones. When epidemics rage in hostile
environments, high-income countries
should not stand idly by but, rather,
join the WHO and local health workers
on the ground, where assistance is badly
needed. This is all far from simple, but

the alternative is to allow dangerous
diseases to go unchecked, threatening
countries, regions, and the globe.
Peacekeeping. Peacekeepers are supposed to act as a neutral force, separating warring factions and providing
“space” for diplomacy to end hostilities.
Yet where communities feel alienated
from decades of violence—including
rape, torture, and possibly genocide19—
peacekeepers can become engulfed in
the conflict. Humanitarian organizations have also resisted armed protection because they want to serve as
mediators, health advocates, and healers.20 Consequently, the United Nations
must fundamentally reform peacekeeping conducted in a health emergency.
The Security Council should provide
peacekeepers with a mandate and modalities fit for the purpose of quelling a
health emergency. Separate from other
peacekeeping missions that may be operating, such a health peacekeeping mission’s mandate should specifically be to
safeguard the public health response,
deploying sufficient forces to enable
health workers to operate safely. This
requires peacekeeper training on health
emergencies and working cooperatively
with first responders. To build trust,
forces should be trained on the values
and strategies of “community policing”—engaging community members
as partners, listening to their concerns,
and respecting their rights and dignity.
Peacekeepers must work with anthropologists and local leaders to value local
culture, customs, and languages. Peacekeepers must build trust and security
from the bottom up, rather than from
the top down.
Diplomacy. A classic tool of statecraft, diplomacy needs to become a
central piece of the global response to
health emergencies during complex
humanitarian crises. The clear aim of
negotiations with belligerents and community members would be safe entry
and a secure working environment
for health and humanitarian workers.
While overall conflict resolution is necessary, the immediate goal should be
to create the respect and trust needed
for impartial and independent health
and humanitarian workers to function.
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Much as diplomacy helped secure the
Taliban’s agreement to allow health
workers in Afghanistan to carry out
polio vaccination,20 negotiations could
result in an agreement that insurgents
would avoid interfering with the public
health response.
Deployment of all needed assets. A
zero-risk policy for deployment of personnel from the United States and other
high-income countries is a recipe for
failure. The WHO and the DRC have
requested U.S. deployment to the Ebola
hot zone. The CDC could fill significant capacity gaps, such as surveillance,
laboratory testing, and contact investigations. Other public agencies, such as
USAID and the National Institutes of
Health’s Fogarty International Center,
could provide peer-to-peer training in
diagnostics, treatment, and the safe use
of personal protective equipment.
Just as the CDC has expertise in
emergency response, the State Department has diplomatic and intelligence
capacities, and thus the responsibility to
act. The diplomatic power of the United States extends beyond intelligence
and mediation to political leverage.
President Obama, for example, secured
an unprecedented Security Council
resolution, which was a milestone in
ultimately bringing the West African
Ebola epidemic under control. Bringing
hostile parties to the negotiating table,
as recently occurred in Yemen, requires
high-level political attention. That level
of political action has been sorely missing in the DRC.
The United States should urgently
create a strategic plan for future deployment of expert personnel to conflict
zones. Rather than having zero risk tolerance, the United States should manage
the risk by shoring up security, engaging
diplomats, and embedding U.S. personnel in ongoing international humanitarian operations through, for example, the
United Nations.
International assistance. The International Health Regulations require every nation to create core health system
capacities to detect, report, and respond
to health emergencies, and they charge
states with providing international assistance to build those capacities.21 Yet
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most countries have failed to meet IHR
standards, including for laboratories,
surveillance, risk communication, and
human resources. And high-income
countries have virtually ignored their
responsibilities for international assistance. The U.S. launched the Global
Health Security Agenda in 2014 to expand capacities, and it recently recommitted itself to the GHSA at the GHSA
Ministerial in Indonesia. Yet Congress
has not reauthorized GSHA funding.
Investing in preparedness is much less
costly than crisis response.
Developing national, inclusive
health systems is a sure way to build
public trust. Beyond health systems, international assistance should extend to
meeting basic needs such as clean water and nutritious food. The public is
much more likely to view foreign health
workers as a force for good if their presence comes with tangible long-term,
sustained improvement in health and
social services—even as ensuring such
needs should hardly depend on a health
crisis that poses international risk.
Toward a New Public Health
Playbook

T

he standard public health playbook
is still vital, combining therapeutic
countermeasures such as vaccines and
antiviral medications with public health
measures such as surveillance, contact
investigations, and hygiene. But in an
era when health emergencies coincide
with complex humanitarian crises, we
cannot expect the old public health to
succeed; we must adapt to the world
we live in. Where distrust and insecurity run deep, politics, diplomacy, and
peacekeeping become vital assets. With
the United Nations Security Council,
the Trump administration, and Western
allies standing idle while international
health actors struggle, the interconnected epidemics of violence and disease escalate.
The Ebola crisis in parts of West
Africa spurred major reforms to the
WHO’s health emergency program.
The ongoing Ebola and humanitarian
crisis in North Kivu ought to similarly
transform how we understand, prepare

for, and respond to future public health
crises in hotbeds of violence and human
suffering. Political actors will need to assume their responsibilities if humanitarians and health workers are to carry out
theirs.
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